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SHOULD AN ERROR IN SEEKING
THE WRONG WRIT BE FATAL?
By HARRY G. FINS*

By a series of legislative and judicial reforms, the Illinois
legal system has ascended from a state of mediocrity in 1933 to
a position responsive to the high standards which justice demands in 1971. This was accomplished in part through the
adoption of the Illinois Judicial Article, effective January 1,
1964 ;1 the promulgation of the new Supreme Court rules in 1966
and amended in 1969 ;2 the passage of the Code of Criminal Pro-

cedure in 1963;3 the passage of the Probate Act of 1939 and
of the
amended in 1965;4 and most significantly, the passage
5
1955.
in
revision
its
and
1933
Civil Practice Act in
The philosophy of the Civil Practice Act is set out in Section 4:
This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies
may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive
rights of the parties."

In addition, Section 34 provides that one is not precluded

from receiving relief for which he did not pray:
Except in cases of default, the prayer for relief does not limit the
relief obtainable, but where other relief is sought the court shall,
by proper orders, and upon terms that may be just, protect the
adverse party against prejudice by reason of surprise. In case of
default, if relief beyond that prayed in the pleading to which the
party is in default is sought, whether by amendment, counterclaim,
* Ph.B., J.D. Author of numerous books and treatises on Illinois and
Federal Practice and Procedure. Contributor of articles to various law
reviews and legal publications. Lecturer in Post-Graduate Division of The
John Marshall Law School (1939-49) and at Lawyers Post-Graduate Clinics
Member of the Joint Committee on Implementation of the
(1949-54).
Judicial Amendment (1961-65) and member of the Special Committee on
Implementation of the Illinois Constitution (1971). One of the draftsmen of
the Illinois Administrative Review Act of 1945 and of the 1963 amendments
thereto, and one of the draftsmen of the 1963-69 amendments to the Illinois
Civil Practice Act.
The author wishes to thank Ronald Hominick, a member of the Journal's
staff for his help in preparation of this article.
1 ILL. CONST. art. VI.
2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A (1969).
a ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 (1969).
4 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3 (1969).
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1969).
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §4 (1969), (Emphasis added.); Skolnick v.
Martin, 32 Ill. 2d 55, 203 N.E.2d 428 (1965); Scofield v. Behm, 63 Ill. App.
2d 140, 211 N.E.2d 127 (1965); Robbins v. Campbell, 65 Ill. App. 2d 478, 213
N.E.2d 641 (1965); Fitzgerald v. Van Buskirk, 96 Ill. App. 2d 432, 239
N.E.2d 330 (1968); Hemingway v. Skinner Engineering Company, 117 Ill.
App. 2d 452, 254 N.E.2d 133 (1969) ; Tone and Eovaldi, Separation of Trials
and Appeals in Multiplicity Actions, 1967 ILL. L.F. 224.
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or otherwise, notice shall be given the defaulted party as provided
by rule.'

Further, Section 42 (2) and (3) of the Act provides:
No pleading is bad in substance which contains such information
as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim
or defense which he is called upon to meet."
All defects in pleading, either in form or substance, not objected to
in the trial court are waived. 9

Finally, Section 46(1) of the Act provides:
At any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed
on just and reasonable terms, introducing any party who ought to
have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, discontinuing as to any
plaintiff or defendant, changing the cause of action or defense or
adding new causes of action or defenses, and in any matter, either
of form or substance, in any process, pleading, bill of particulars
or proceedings, which may enable the plaintiff to sustain the claim
for which it was intended to be brought or the defendant to make
a defense or assert cross demand.10

Although through the passage of the Civil Practice Act a
liberal philosophy as to civil pleadings was stated, the legislature
did not expressly include the extraordinary writs within the Act.
Accordingly, Illinois courts apparently have not been compelled
to apply this liberal philosophy to the application for writs of
injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The
result has been a totally inconsistent treatment towards such
writs, often to the prejudice of the plaintiff or petitioner.
I.

NON-LIBERAL APPROACH

In Graves Motor Co. v. Drainage District,1 1 the plaintiff
filed a complaint to enjoin the Green River Drainage District
Commissioners from levying taxes against land which was
within the boundaries of another district. Defendant's moILL. Ray. STAT. ch. 110, §34 (1969).
ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110, §42(2) (1969); Davis v. Hoeffken Bros., 60
Ill. App. 2d 139, 208 N.E.2d 370 (1965) ; Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67
Ill. App. 2d 19, 215 N.E.2d 424 (1966); Brown v. County of Lake, 67 Ill.
App. 2d 144, 213 N.E.2d 790 (1966) ; Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill. App. 2d 166,
222 N.E.2d 815 (1966); Edwards v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 79 Il1. App. 2d 48,
223 N.E.2d 163 (1967); Fitzgerald v. Van Buskirk, 96 Ill. App. 2d 432,
239 N.E.2d 330 (1968) ; Hemingway v. Skinner Engineering Co., 117 Ill.
App. 2d 452, 254 N.E.2d 133 (1969) ; County of Winnebago v. Willsey, 122 Ill.
App. 2d 149, 258 N.E.2d 138 (1970) ; Wilson v. Wilson, 56 Ill. App. 2d 187,
205 N.E.2d 636 (1965) ; Chambers v. Palaggi, 88 Ill. App. 2d 221, 232 N.E.2d
69 (1967) ; Chicago v. Westphalen, 95 Ill. App. 2d 331, 238 N.E.2d 225
(1968); Chimerofsky v. School Dist. No. 63, 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 257 N.E.2d
480 (1970).
9
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §42(3) (1969).
78

10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 §46(1)

(1969),

(Emphasis added.): Simmons

v. Hendricks, 32 Il1. 2d 489, 207 N.E.2d 440 (1965) ; Anderson v. Gousset, 60
Ill. App. 2d 309, 208 N.E.2d 37 (1965) ; Scardina v. Colletti, 63 Ill. App. 2d
481, 211 N.E.2d 762 (1965); Moser Lumber, Inc. v. Morgan, 106 Ill. App.
2d 339, 245 N.E.2d 310 (1969) ; Cody v. Ladurini, 109 I1. App. 2d 116, 249
N.E.2d 315 (1969); Jirik v. General Mills, Inc.. 112 Il. App. 2d 111, 251
N.E.2d 353 (1969); O'Leary v. Siegel, 120 Ill. App. 2d 12, 256 N.E.2d 127
(1970).
11 6 Ill. 2d 445, 129 N.E.2d 6 (1955).
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tion to dismiss was sustained by the trial court which held that
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by quo warranto. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that any objections to an annexation of territority cannot be brought by a suit
for injunction, "but that the available remedy of quo warranto
must be employed."12 The court further found no independent
grounds for equitable jurisdiction and held that an injunction
was not an available remedy. 3 Even though petitioner's prayer
for relief and the court's recommended relief were both extraordinary remedies, a determination of petitioner's substantive
rights was sacrificed because of the absence of a clear mandate
relating to the pleading for extraordinary writs.
In Shaw v. Lorenz14 a plaintiff was again deprived of a
speedy determination of his substantive rights because of praying for the wrong relief. However, the Civil Practice Act states
that "the prayer for relief does not limit the relief obtainable"15
and further that "no pleading is bad in substance which contains
such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the
nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet."'
Here the Illinois Director of Highways had closed a highway
which intersected with Route 66 thereby depriving plaintiffs of
convenient access to the route. Plaintiffs conceded that they
had an action for mandamus to compel defendants to institute
proceedings to ascertain damages under the Eminent Domain
Act. 17 However, they chose instead to pray for a temporary and

permanent injunction to prevent defendants from closing access
to the route without prior condemnation proceedings, and for a
mandatory injunction to require the closed intersection to be restored. The action was dismissed by the trial court and plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court on the basis of a
constitutional question."8 On appeal defendants raised for the
first time the defense that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at
law for mandamus. Plaintiffs urged that this defense was not
raised in the trial court and must be regarded as waived; i.e. "All
defects in pleading either in form or substance, not objected to
in the trial court are waived."' 19 Plaintiffs relied upon Bryant v.
Lakeside Galleries, Inc. 20 which held "it has long been a rule of
procedure that a defense not made in the court below will not be
1

2Id.at 447, 129 N.E.2d at 7.
13 Id. at 448, 129 N.E.2d at 8.
14 42 Il. 2d 246, 246 N.E.2d 285 (1969).
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §34 (1969).
16 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §42(2) (1969).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 47 (1969).
18 See note 14 supra.
19

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §42(3) (1969).
N.E.2d 412 (1949).

20 402 Ill.
466, 84
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considered when the record is reviewed here.

'21

The Supreme

Court, in accordance with the philosophy that all pleadings
should "be liberally construed to the end that controversies may
be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive
rights of the parties '' 22 held that "the appellee may urge any
point in support of the judgment on appeal, even though not directly ruled on by the trial court, so long as the factual basis for
such point was before the trial court."213

The court then con-

cluded its opinion by taking a non-liberal approach against the
appellant and held: "The availability of mandamus is an adequate defense against the granting of the injunctive relief sought
here. ' 124

Such inconsistent liberal treatment of the rights of one

party as opposed to the non-liberal treatment of the other can
hardly result in a fair and impartial determination of one's substantive rights, or as shown here, any trial of those rights.
A non-liberal approach was again employed in the case of
People ex rel. Shelly v. Frye.25 A prisoner in a State penitentiary corresponded with a woman who was separated from her
husband. There was nothing in the opinion to suggest any illicit
relationship between the prisoner and the woman. The warden,
who censored the incoming and outgoing mail of all prisoners,
refused to allow the prisoner to correspond with the woman. The
prisoner, asserting his constitutional right of free speech under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 26 filed in an Illinois Circuit Court a habeas corpus petition against the warden to determine whether the warden had authority to interfere with the
prisoner's correspondence. The Circuit Court of Randolph
County dismissed the petition because:
The remedy of habeas corpus is available only to obtain the release
of a prisoner who has been incarcerated under a judgment of an
original trial court which lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter
or the person of the defendant, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent2 to the prisoner's conviction which entitles the
prisoner to release.

7

Had the court employed a liberal approach to the pleading of
habeas corpus, the substantive rights of the prisoner could have
been speedily determined. Instead, petitioner's prayer for relief
was denied. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, without advising the prisoner (who appeared pro se in the circuit and Supreme courts) what the right remedy was. Our judicial system
211 d. at 473-74, 84 N.E.2d at 418: Bittner v. Field, 354 Ill.
215, 188 N.E.

342 (1933) ; Hill v. Siffermann, 230 Ifl. 19, 82 N.E. 338 (1907) ; City of Mattoon v. Noyes, 218 Ill. 594, 75 N.E. 1065 (1905).
22 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §4 (1969).
23 See note 14 supra.
24/d.

Ill. 2d 263, 246 N.E.2d 251 (1969).
U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
? See note 25 supra.

2542
26
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should no longer tolerate such gross inconsideration for the substantive rights of those before the courts.
The Supreme Court of Illinois remained consistent in its
non-liberal approach to extraordinary legal remedies in People
ex rel. St. George v. Woods.2 8 Here an alleged felon, who was
unable to post bail as a result of indigency, was confined to the
Cook County jail while awaiting a preliminary hearing on the
charge of aggravated battery. He petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus to establish his right to vote in a public election
during his period of imprisonment for lack of bail. The Supreme
Court recognized that serious constitutional questions were involved, but refused to pass upon the merits of the case and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the petition on the ground
that "a review of claims which are non-jurisdictional in nature is
not available by means of habeas corpus, even though a denial
of constitutional rights is claimed."2 9 Quite unadbashedly, the
Illinois Supreme Court found justice and the substantive rights
of the petitioner, secondary to a defect in pleading which, as
easily as was preyed upon, could have been treated in accordance
with the philosophy that "pleadings shall be liberally construed
with a view to doing substantive justice between the parties." 0

II

INCONSISTENT TREATMENT IN ILLINOIS

In complete juxtaposition to the non-liberal approach heretofore examined, the Illinois courts have, upon occasion, adhered
to the liberal philosophy of pleadings as promulgated in the Civil
3l
Practice Act. In Jarrettv. Jarrett
a post-divorce petition was
filed where the jurisdiction of the circuit court to modify the
custody provisions of a divorce decree after the death of the custodial spouse was at issue. The Supreme Court pointed out that
the remedy of habeas corpus was properly employed to determine
this same issue in People ex rel. Good v. Hoxie32 and in Smith v.
Bruner. 3 However, the court concluded that the circuit court
had jurisdiction whether the application for change in child custody "bore the title of the divorce case or the caption of an in28 47 Ill.
29 Id. at

2d 261, 265 N.E.2d 164 (1970).
263, 265 N.E.2d at 165; People ex rel. Lewis v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d
58, 245 N.E.2d 483 (1969) ; People ex rel. Shelly v. Frye, 42 Ill. 2d 263, 246
,N.E.2d 251 (1969).
so ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §33(3) (1969).
31 415 Ill. 126, 112 N.E.2d 694 (1953).
82 175 Ill. App. 563 (1912); in -People v. Clark, Illinois Supreme Court
Docket No. 43603, decided May 27, 1971, the defendant filed a petition under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The Supreme Court found that the issue
involved "only a question of statutory interpretation," not one "of constitutional magnitude" and therefore the procedure by petition under the PostConviction Hearing Act, which is limited to constitutional issues, was improper. The Court said: "However, to avoid the necessity of the defendant's
fihng a separate action under the Habeas Corpus Act, (ILL. REv. STAT. 1969
ch. 65, par. 1 et seq.) we shall consider the merits of defendant's argument.;
38 312 Ill. App. 658, 39 N.E.2d 78 (1942).
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dependent habeas corpus proceeding. 3 4 The substantive rights
of the parties were not to be sacrificed for a strict and technical
adherence to the appropriateness of nomenclature.
With great reluctance, the Illinois courts have also followed
a liberal approach when more than a single extraordinary remedy
is sought in the same suit. In Hamer v. Jones" taxpayers sought
a declaratory judgment, injunction and mandamus against the
Illinois Director of Revenue for his alleged failure to assess all
taxable property at its full cash value in accordance with Article
IX of the Illinois constitution.36 Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with the court holding that it could:
in the exercise of its judicial discretion deny the request for the
writ of mandamus, the request for a declaratoryjudgment and the
request for a writ of injunction, where to issue the writs and
declarations prayed for would cause chaos and confusionA 7
It was further held "that to order the Department of Revenue to
assess all property in Lake County at its full, fair cash value, as
required by statute, would cause chaos and confusion." 38 On
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed.3 9 Not to be so easily denied
a determination of their substantive rights, the taxpayers again
sought the same relief in a suit against the new Illinois Director
of Revenue in Hamer v. Mahin.40 Although the trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that the State Supreme Court
alone retained the power to determine when, and to what extent,
compliance with Article IX will be required, there was no mention of denying plaintiff's relief due to the nature of the remedies
sought. The Supreme Court held that it did not alone retain the
power to determine whether there was compliance with the constitutional command for tax uniformity, and directed the trial
court to hear the case on the merits.41 Finally after four years
and a change in the office of the Illinois Director of Revenue,
plaintiffs were provided an opportunity to receive an adjudication of their substantive rights. Such is not a speedy determination of those rights, but does exhibit a reluctant trend toward
giving top priority to the substantive rights of the litigant.
Since Hamer v. Mahin42 has not yet been decided on remand
by the Supreme Court, it is hoped the trial court will not revert
to its non-liberal approach in derrogation of the substantive
rights of the parties, but will follow the trend toward a more
84 See note 31 supra.
539 Ill. 2d 360, 235 N.E.2d 589 (1968).
86 ILL. CONST. art. IX (1870).
87 See note 35 supra.

88 Id.
89 Id. at 373, 235 N.E.2d at 596.
40 47 Ill. 2d 252, 265 N.E.2d 151 (1970).
4'aId. at 254, 265 N.E.2d at 152.

42 See note 40 supra.
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liberal approach much like that followed in Kipperman v. City
of Markham.43 In this case plaintiff challenged the city's denial
of application for a real estate broker's license. Plaintiff sought
a declaration of the invalidity of an ordinance restricting the
number of real estate broker licenses issued ;44 an injunction
against the enforcement of the ordinance, and alternatively, a
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of a license to plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the action, 45 but the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion which stated that the city may impose
non-prohibitive license fees for regulation and revenue, but the
city must show cause as to why the applicant's request for a license was denied.4 6 The application for relief by injunction,
mandamus and a declaratoryjudgment in the same suit was not
denied in derrogation of the plaintiff's substantive rights.

III.

PRONOUNCING LIBERAL PRINCIPLE BUT RENDERING
NON-LIBERAL DECISION

Adding to the confusion in construing prayers for relief

through extraordinary remedies, the Illinois courts have occasionally pronounced a liberal principle much like that provided
for in the Civil Practice Act, but have rendered a non-liberal decision. In People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski 7 a petition was filed
for habeas corpus by one imprisoned for aggravated battery.
Petitioner allegedly was informed that he would be denied bail
unless he made a confession. He signed a statement in which he
thought he admitted fault as to an accident which was the direct
cause of the victim's injuries. The statement, in fact, admitted
guilt to the crime of aggravated battery. His habeas corpus petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing and without appointment of counsel. Although this procedure allowed by the
court was in itself unconstitutional, 48 the Circuit Court of Macon
County added insult to petitioner's injury by dismissing the petition because the appropriate remedy was by petition under the
Post Conviction Hearing Act.4
The Supreme Court pronounced
the liberal principle that " . . . the trial court could properly
have disregarded the habeas corpus label, and treated the document as a post-conviction petition . . . "50 however it decided the
trial court" . . . was not required to do so, and its judgment dis47 Ill. 2d 285, 265 N.E.2d 166 (1970).
REv. STAT. ch. 24, par. 11-42-1 (1965).
45 See note 43 supra.
48 47 Ill. 2d 285, 288, 265 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1970).
47 38 Ill. 2d 396, 231 N.E.2d 433 (1967).
43

44 ILL.

48
49

Id. at 397, 231 N.E.2d at 433.
See note 47 supra.

50 38 Il. 2d 396, 398, 231 N.E.2d 433, 434 (1967).

1971]

Error in Seeking the Wrong Writ

missing the habeas corpus petition was not erroneous." 51 Thus
the court pronounced a liberal principle, but any significance to
be attached thereto was mitigated, if not totally destroyed.
A similar pronouncement for a liberal interpretation of a
pleading for extraordinary relief was made in People ex rel.
Lewis v. Frye,52 however the court again rendered a non-liberal
decision. A petition was filed for habeas corpus in the Circuit
Court of Union County by one who had pleaded guilty to the
crime of incest. Later he contended that he was insane at the
time of his plea and the State's attorney knew of said insanity.
The circuit court dismissed the petition because the proper
remedy again was under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. On
appeal the Supreme Court cited the liberal pronouncement of
Macieiski but then went on to affirm the decision of the circuit
court5 3 Plaintiff then filed a petition for habeas corpus with
the Circuit Court of Randolph County. This time he contended
that he was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing at the
previous proceeding. The circuit court denied his petition. On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that habeas corpus
is not available to review errors which only render the judgthough
ment voidable and are of a non-jurisdictional nature, even
54
a claim of a denial of constitutional rights is involved.
Thus the Illinois courts seem to be in a hopeless quandary as to a
At times the
proper approach to extraordinary relief.
courts have failed to see any problem in construing the application for extraordinary writs and the result has been a denial of
the litigant's substantive rights. At other times the courts have
recognized the existence of the problem, but lacking direction,
have also sacrificed the substantive rights of the petitioner for
an archaic non-liberal construction of pleadings. Only less than
occasionally have the substantive rights of a petitioner for an
extraordinary writ been viewed as the primary issue for determination by the court. Such inconsistencies are employed at
the expense of justice. They cannot be so tolerated by the high
standards which justice demands today.
FEDERAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

The Supreme Court of the United States in dealing with
review by appeal and review by petition for certiorari has long
protected the substantive rights of a litigant who applied for the
51

/d.

Ill. 2d 58, 245 N.E.2d 483 (1969). Petitioner relied on ILL. REV.
ch. 110A, §302 (a) (3) which provides for direct appeals to the SuCourt from final judgments of circuit courts in cases of habeas corpus.
preme
. 5342 Ill. 2d 311, 247 N.E.2d 410 (1969).
Petitioner relied on ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, §302(a) (3) (1969).
.41d. at 313, 247 N.E.2d at 411, (Emphasis added). People ex rel. Haven v. Macieiski, 38 Ill. 2d 396, 231 N.E.2d 433 (1967) ; People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 589, 221 N.E.2d 279 (1966).
5242

STAT.

196

The John Marshall Journalof Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 4:188

wrong remedy as redress for his grievances. Federal law provides that if an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
is taken in a case where the proper mode of review is by petition for certiorari, this alone shall not be ground for dismissal.
The papers whereby the appeal was taken shall be regarded as a
petition for certiorari and acted on as if duly presented to the
Supreme Court of the United States at the proper time."
The
substantive rights of a litigant are of primary importance and
will not be sacrificed for a non-liberal approach to nomenclature.
In Johnson v. Avery56 a petitioner was in the Tennessee
State penitentiary serving a life sentence. He was transferred
to maximum security for violating a prison regulation which
forbid inmates from assisting other prisoners in preparation of
petitions for post-conviction relief. Petitioner filed in the United
States District Court a "motion for law books and a typewriter
in which he sought relief from his confinement in the maximum
security building."'57 The District Court treated his motion as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, heard the case on its merits
and ordered him released from disciplinary confinement. He was
restored to the status of an ordinary prisoner, and the prison
regulation was held void because in effect it barred illiterate
prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus. All of this was
accomplished on a "motion for law books and a typewriter." 5
An error in application of appropriate nomenclature was
again considered trivial in relation to the substantive rights of
the plaintiff in Smith v. Resor.'9 The United States District
Court had denied a petition for habeas corpus by a member of an
army reserve unit who was called for active duty and sought to
be restored to his reserve status. The United States Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court "with the suggestion that it treat this action as a mandamus proceeding"80 to
compel the military to follow its own appeal procedures regarding petitioner's long hair and allegedly unjust call to active duty.
The label placed upon the relief was properly considered secondary to the substantive rights of the plaintiff.
SUGGESTED CURE

The competition for judicial power in England resulted in a
"splintered" court system, consisting of a variety of tribunals,
each with limited authority.6 1 The American colonists blindly
55 28 U.S.C. §2103 (1948).
56 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
57Id. at 484.
58 Id.

59 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).

60 Id. at 147. (Emphasis added.)
61 Blackstone in Book III of his Commentaries on the Laws of England,

discusses the following courts in the judicial system of England: Courts
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followed the model of the mother country and the "splintered"
court system continued after the American Revolution. The result was that available remedies and the jurisdiction of the courts
were set forth in unalterable rules. Through judicial reform,
Illinois has broken the shackles of a "splintered" court system.
A most significant reform was accomplished by the judicial article whereby the circuit courts have "original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters. '62 There is no reason today to stifle the
right of a litigant who has merely erred in the application of
appropriate nomenclature. It is therefore suggested that the
Illinois Injunction Act,6 3 the Mandamus Act,6 4 Quo Warranto
Act,6 5 and Habeas Corpus Act 66 be amended by adding to each
Act a section reading as follows:
Where an action or proceeding is brought and the court determines
that the party has stated facts which would entitle him to relief
but has sought the wrong remedy, the court shall not dismiss the
action or proceeding but shall grant the appropriate relief to which
the party is entitled as if he so requested.
This would insure that the philosophy of the Civil Practice Act
and the judicial article will be extended to protect the substantive rights of parties applying for extraordinary relief.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In the hope of being of assistance to the Legislature in the
improvement of the Illinois procedural law, the following proposed four bills are submitted:
I Injunction
AN ACT to add Section 24 to "An Act to revise the law in
relation to injunction," approved March 25, 1874, as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 24 is added to "An Act to revise the law
in relation to injunction," approved March 25, 1874, as amended,
the added Section to read as follows:
piepoudre (p. 32), court baron (p. 33), hundred court (p. 34), county court
(p. 35), court of common pleas (p. 37), court of King's bench (p. 41), court
of exchequer (p. 42), court of equity (p. 45), the high court of chancery (p.
46), court of exchequer chamber (p. 55), house of peers (p. 56), courts of
assize and nisi prius (p. 57), the archdeacon's court (p. 64), the consistory
court (p. 64), the court of arches (p. 64), the court of peculiars (p. 65), the
prerogative court (p. 66), military courts (p. 68), forest courts (p. 71),
commissioner of sewers (p. 73), court of policies of assurance (p. 74), court

of marchaleca and the palace court (p. 76), courts of Wales (p. 77), courts
of Lancaster (p. 78), courts of Palatine (p. 80), municipal courts of London
(p. 81) and the courts of the universities (p. 83).
62 ILL. CONST., art. VI §9 (1870).
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 69 (1969).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 87 (1969).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 112 (1969).
66 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 65 (1969).
65
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See. 24. Where an action or proceeding is brought and the
court determines that the party has stated facts which would entitle him to relief but has sought the wrong remedy, the court
shall not dismiss the action or proceeding but shall grant the appropriate relief to which the party is entitled as if he so requested.
II Mandamus
AN ACT to add Section 12 to "An Act to revise the law in
relation to mandamus," approved February 25, 1874, as
amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 12 is added to "An Act to revise the
law in relation to mandamus," approved February 25, 1874, as
amended, the added Section to read as follows:
Sec. 12. Where an action or proceeding is brought and the
court determines that the party has stated facts which would
entitle him to relief but has sought the wrong remedy, the court
shall not dismiss the action or proceeding but shall grant the
appropriate relief to which the party is entitled as if he so requested.
III Quo Warranto
AN ACT to add Section 9 to "An Act in relation to practice
and procedure in cases of quo warranto," approved July 2, 1937,
as amended.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 9 is added to "An Act in relation to
practice and procedure in cases of quo warranto," approved July
2, 1937, as amended, the added Section to read as follows:
Sec. 9. Where an action or proceeding is brought and the
court determines that the party has stated facts which would entitle him to relief but has sought the wrong remedy, the court
shall not dismiss the action or proceeding but shall grant the
appropriate relief to which the party is entitled as if he so requested.
IV Habeas Corpus
AN ACT to add Section 37 to "An Act to revise the law in
relation to habeas corpus," approved March 2, 1874, as amended.
Be is enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the General Assembly:

1971]

Error in Seeking the Wrong Writ

199

Section 1. Section 37 is added to "An Act to revise the law
in relation to habeas corpus," approved March 2, 1874, as
amended, the added Section to read as follows:
Sec. 37. Where an action or proceeding is brought and the
court determines that the party has stated facts which would
entitle him to relief but has sought the wrong remedy, the court
shall not dismiss the action or proceeding but shall grant the
appropriaterelief to which the party is entitled as if he so requested.

